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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 3069

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TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE

SUBJ: CSCE AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: (A) USNATO 2640 (B) USNATO 2591 (C) USNATO 2009

1. TRANSMITTED BELOW ARE TEXTS OF TWO CSCE/PR PAPERS DRAFTED BY CANES AND GERMANS IN ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN IS DRAFT TRANSMITTED REF C.

2. DANISH DRAFT, UNDERTAKEN AT SPC URGING (REF A), BASICALLY EXPANDS UPON POINTS COVERED IN IS DRAFT BUT ALSO DRAWS NECESSARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN WESTERN CONCEPTS OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND WHAT SOVIETS MEAN BY PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

BEGIN DANISH TEXT:

PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF A POSSIBLE CSCE AGREEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. BY SIGNING THE FINAL DOCUMENTS AT THE THIRD
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STAGE OF THE CSCE THE ALLIED COUNTRIES WILL CONFIRM THAT THEY CONSIDER THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE TO BE A SATISFACOTRY STEP IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, WHICH RAISES THE HOPE OF FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN

EAST/ WEST RELATIONS, ALSO IN THE MILITARY SPHERE.

THE ALLIES CAN QUITE JUSTIFIABLY POINT TO A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS WHICH THEY HAVE ACHIEVED IN ALL THE FIELDS EXAMINED BY THE CONFERENCE.

IN ORDER TO AVOID UNDUE OPTIMISM BOTH THE SHORT-COMINGS OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE FACT THAT IT IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE NEED FOR MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DEFENCE - WHICH IS BOTH A PRE-REQUISITE FOR THE FURTHER PURSUIT OF DETENTE AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE - SHOULD BE POINTED OUT.

2. THE SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES CAN ON THEIR SIDE BE EXPECTED TO PRESENT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE AS A TOTAL TURNING-POINT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

THEY WILL HIGHLIGHT THOSE POINTS THEY FIND MOST IN THEIR FAVOUR AND TRY TO MINIMIZE OR MISCONSTRUE THOSE WHICH ARE NOT.

THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO USE THE RESULTS OF THE CSCE TO WEAKEN THE POLITICAL DETERMINATION OF THE WEST TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OUTCOME OF THE CSCE IS PRESENTED BY GOVERNMENTS AND BY THE MEDIA IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE WILL BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. MINISTERIAL AND OTHER OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WILL CERTAINLY BE ANALYSED AND COMMENTED UPON BY THE MEDIA AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO GIVE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE TO THIS.

SINCE SITUATIONS WILL VARY WIDELY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AGREE ON A COMMON LINE OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION. IT WILL, CONFIDENTIAL

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HOWEVER, BE DESIRABLE TO AVOID DISCORD IN THE PRESENTATION OF BASIC ISSUES, AND THERE IS THEREFORE ADVANTAGE IN HAVING AN AGREED BODY OF MATERIAL AND ARGUMENTS TO BE DRAWN ON AT WILL ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE FOLLOWING IS THEREFORE PUT FORWARD AS A GENERAL GUIDANCE, WHILE MORE SPECIFIC COMMENTS ARE SET OUT IN ANNEX A (CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION, PART II). REFERENCE IS ALSO MADE TO DOCUMENT C-M(75)28 (REPORT OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE).

II GENERAL GUIDANCE

THE FOLLOWING POINTS CAN USEFULLY BE MADE AND ELABORATED UPON WHEN INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT CSCE:

4. THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE GIVES RISE TO SATISFACTION FOR ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS THE WARSAW PACT WHICH FIRST PROPOSED THE CONFERENCE BUT THE ALLIED COUNTRIES HAVE DURING THE PREPARATORY PERIOD GREATLY INFLUENCED ITS CHARACTER AND SCOPE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN CONCEPTS. ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE SHOWN A WILL TO COMPROMISE. THE FACT THAT 35 STATES HAVE NEGOTIATED TOGETHER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE IS UNPRECEDENTED AND SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF.

5. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION APPROACHED THE CSCE WITH THE MAIN AIM OF GETTING ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS QUO IN EUROPE, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE SOUGHT AND SUCCEEDED IN KEEPING OPEN THE POSSIBILITIES FOR GRADUAL AND PEACEFUL CHANGES OF RELATIONSHIPS. THE WEST WISHES TO BUILD TOWARDS INCREASED COOPERATION, UNDERSTANDING AND DETENTE AND REGARDS

THE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT THE CSCE AS INSTRUMENTAL IN THIS PROCESS.

6. THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A DYNAMIC AND CONTINUOUS CONFIDENTIAL

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EVOLUTION TOWARDS GREATER EAST/WEST COOPERATION AND DETENTE DOES NOT IMPLY A DESIRE FOR RESHAPING INTER-STATE-RELATIONS OR FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

IT AIMS AT LESSENING OBSTACLES TO INCREASED EAST/WEST CONTACTS AND STRESSES THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN THE PROCESS. THE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT CSCE IN THIS RESPECT APPLY TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR BELONGING TO DIFFERENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND DETENTE IS THUS DIFFERENT FROM THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE", WHICH CALLS NOT FOR IDEOLOGICAL TOLERANCE, BUT FOR UNREMITTING IDEOL-

OGICAL STRUGGLE WITH THE FINAL AIM OF OVERTHROWING THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM. THE SOVIET CONCEPT DEALS WITH RELATIONS AMONG STATES AND IS NOT VALID AMONG SOCIALIST STATES.

7. THE ALLIES WERE ABLE AT THE CSCE TO ACHIEVE

POSITIVE RESULTS THROUGH PATIENT AND COORDINATED
EFFORTS WHICH STRENGTHENED THEIR SOLIDARITY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 6 USNATO 3069

FOR EXAMPLE:

A) HUMANITARIAN AND CULTURAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED FOR THE FIRST TIME AS LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS
FOR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN,
EASTERN AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, AND THERE HAVE
BEEN PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF THESE SUBJECTS.
UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE I.A. BEEN REACHED IN THE AREA
OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION, MARRIAGES BETWEEN NATIONALS
OF DIFFERENT STATES, GREATER ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AND IMPROVED WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS
AND SCHOLARS. THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS FIELD ARE
OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE, THOUGH THE PARTICULAR SIGNIF-
ICANCE OF SPECIFIC ISSUES VARIES FROM ONE COUNTRY
TO ANOTHER ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.

B) A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, NEGOTIATED AS
A GUIDE TO FUTURE RELATIONS AMONG CSCE-PARTICIPANTS
CALLS I.A. FOR NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF OTHERS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

IT IS A REFLECTION OF THE SUCCESSFUL INSISTENCE
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OF THE ALLIANCE ON MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE IN-

DIVIDUAL (SEE PARA 6) THAT A TEXT HAS BEEN DRAWN UP CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES WHICH SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZES THE PART PLAYED BY INDIVIDUALS IN DEVELOPING SUCH COOPERATION.

THE TEXT RECOGNIZES THE PRINCIPLE THAT EXISTING EUROPEAN FRONTIERS ARE INVIOABLE, BUT ALSO THAT THEY CAN BE CHANGED BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNDER A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

ALL THE PRINCIPLES ARE OF EQUAL VALUE AND INTERDEPENDENT.

C) UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE ALSO BEEN REACHED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD WHICH SEEK TO IMPROVE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AMONG EUROPEAN STATES, E.G. THROUGH PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES.

D) USEFUL PROVISIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN FORMULATED WHICH SHOULD FACILITATE WESTERN TRADE CONTACTS IN THE EAST TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES.

8. THE ALLIES HAVE MET GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TEXTS ARE NOT ALL UNAMBIGUOUS. THEY DO NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUT ARE OF A POLITICAL AND MORAL VALUE.

THIS UNDERLINES THE ALL-IMPORTANT FACTOR OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGREEMENTS ARE IMPLEMENTED IS THE ONLY TRUE CRITERION FOR THE FINAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE. (POSSIBLE SENTENCE ON THE SUITE ARRANGEMENTS).

IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT CONSTRUCTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS WILL OPEN NEW AREAS FOR EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS (SEE PARA 9).

9. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CSCE
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THE ALLIES VIEW THE CONFERENCE AS BUT A STEP AND A STEPPING-STONE IN THE DETENTE PROCESS.

THIS MEANS BOTH THAT IN THEIR VIEW IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A CAPSTONE OR TURNING-POINT AND THAT IT SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL. THE GRADUAL PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY MUST BE CONTINUED AND CARRIED FORWARD ALSO IN THE MILITARY SPHERE. THE ALLIES MUST ENSURE

THAT THE MILITARY ASPECTS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE WARSAW PACT IN APPROACHING OTHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS MBFR #).

#) POSSIBLE FRENCH RESERVATION.

10. ONE OF THE POSITIVE FEATURES OF THE ENTERPRISE HAS BEEN TO PERMIT ALL PARTICIPANTS TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS.

THE CONFERENCE HAS HAD GREAT VALUE FOR THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED VERY USEFULLY AND ON MANY POINTS SUPPORTED ALLIED VIEWPOINTS.

THE ROLE OF THE USA AND CANADA IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS WELL AS THAT OF THE EEC.

11. DESPITE THE POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT THE CSCE, UNDUE OPTIMISM AS TO THE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE EAST SHOULD BE AVOIDED BECAUSE:

A) THE RESULTS ARE COMPARATIVELY MODEST.

B) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN TO WHAT EXTENT THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED (SEE PARA 8).

C) THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO INCREASE AND IMPROVE THEIR ARMED FORCES FAR IN EXCESS OF THE LEVEL REQUIRED FOR SELF DEFENCE.
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THIS MEANS A CONTINUED NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE.

D) THE SOVIET UNION STILL PROPOUNDS THE UN-ACCEPTABLE CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (SEE PARA 6).

III PRACTICAL STEPS

12. THE MANNER AND TIMING OF THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION WILL REQUIRE ATTENTION. SOME PREPARATORY STATEMENTS COULD BE DESIRABLE BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND PHASE OR IMMEDIATELY AT OR AFTER ITS CONCLUSION, AND ADVANCE CONSULTATION ON THESE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. STATEMENTS BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE CONCLUDING PHASE ITSELF WILL BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE. THERE IS LIKELY ALSO TO BE A NEED FOR CAREFUL FOLLOW-UP STATEMENTS.

END DANISH TEXT.

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3. FRG TEXT, DRAFTED INDEPENDENTLY OF DANISH EFFORT, WAS PREFACED BY INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT WESTERN CSCE/PR OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS. BOTH ARE TRANSMITTED BELOW. WHILE GERMAN APPROACH IS PERHAPS MORE GENERAL AND FEATURES OVERALL CONCEPTS SUCH AS WESTERN DETENTE OBJECTIVES, SOLIDARITY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MORE PROMINENTLY THAN DOES DANISH PAPER, IT TOO ESSENTIALLY COVERS POINTS MADE IN IS TEXT.

BEGIN FRG TEXTS:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELATION ASPECTS OF A POSSIBLE CSCE AGREEMENT

WITH RESPECT TO THE PUBLIC RELATIONS POLICY TO BE PURSUED BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING PHASE III OF CSCE, MY AUTHORITIES HAVE ASKED ME TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE DISCUSSION OF A COMMON BASIS FOR ALLIED CSCE PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED THOROUGHLY. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT WE SHOULD NOT PROCEED UNDER PRESSURE OF TIME.

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WE WOULD FAVOUR AN UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE ALLIES THAT THEY WILL, IN DECISIVE MATTERS, ADHERE TO AN AGREED FRAMEWORK OF

PRESENTATION. SINCE WE MUST EXPECT A BROAD AND HIGHLY INTENSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN FROM THE EAST, WE NEED A FIRM AND COMMON BASIS TO COUNTER IT.

WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD DEAL IN OUR GUIDANCE WITH TWO SUBJECTS:

I - CONDITIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PRACTICAL APPROACH OF OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS;

II - A FRAMEWORK OF PRESENTATION.

I.

AS FAR AS THE CONDITIONS, OBJECTIVES AND THE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS ARE CONCERNED, WE THINK THAT WE SHOULD FIRST OF ALL ASK OURSELVES THREE QUESTIONS:

1. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE ENGAGE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES?

WE FEEL THAT WE ARE FACED WITH THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM: PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST IS LARGELY UNINFORMED, PARTLY

DISINTERESTED AND PARTLY CONFUSED BY DETAILS. THE SAME PUBLIC OPINION WILL, HOWEVER, BE CONFRONTED WITH THE FINAL PHASE OF CSCE WHERE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WILL SIGN, AT A SUMMIT MEETING, IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS. IT WILL BE THE TASK OF OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS TO REDRESS THE BALANCE AND DISSEMINATE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION ABOUT CSCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

2. WHAT DO WE WANT TO ACCOMPLISH?

WE WANT THE PUBLIC TO BE BETTER INFORMED AND MORE INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF CSCE. WE WANT THE PUBLIC TO REGARD THE RESULTS OF CSCE AS A SUCCESS OF WESTERN DETENTE EFFORTS AND AS A RESULT OF JOINT ENDEAVOURS OF ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. FINALLY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DASH EXAGGERATED HOPES AND DAMP ANY POSSIBLE EUPHORIA.

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3. HOW DO WE WANT TO GO ABOUT IT*

IT FOLLOWS FROM WHAT HAS JUST BEEN SAID THAT WE SHOULD PRESENT ALL CSCE RESULTS AS THE OUTCOME OF JOINT EAST-WEST EFFORTS. THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE EASTERN EXPLANATIONS BY PRESENTING OUR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE CSCE RESULTS IN A CONCLUSIVE MANNER. WE SHOULD, FURTHERMORE, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, AS FAR AS THE WEST IS CONCERNED, CSCE WAS A SUCCESS BUT NOT A VICTORY. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE SHOULD ONE AGAIN DESCRIBE THE BASIC OUTLINES OF THE WESTERN DETENTE CONCEPT IN ITS DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE HARMEL REPORT OF 1967.

II.

HAVING IN MIND THESE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS MY AUTHORITIES HAVE DRAFTED A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK OF INTERPRETATION. IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT TO ME THAT THIS DRAFT, AS THE VALUABLE DRAFT OF THE DANISH DELEGATION, IS MEANT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ONGOING DISCUSSIONS. THEREFORE WE WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS AND AMENDMENTS TO THIS DRAFT, AND I WOULD FORESEE THAT WE OURSELVES MAY SUGGEST CERTAIN ALTERATIONS IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

1. OVERALL APPRAISAL OF CSCE

1.1. WE SHALL WELCOME A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI AFTER ABOUT THREE YEARS OF PREPARATIONS. THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE WILL REPRESENT A SUCCESS FOR ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. IT IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE DETERMINATION OF THESE STATES TO REDUCE THE CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE BY PEACEFUL COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE.

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1.2. THE FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS. TO NEGOTIATE MEANS TO SEEK COMPROMISES. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT CSCE COULD NOT AND SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE SOME PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD CHANGE THE POLITICAL OR SOCIAL SYSTEM OF OTHERS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD HAVE LED TO IRRITATING NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND RENEWED CONFRONTATION, TO THE DETRIMENT OF DETENTE AND THUS TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE PEOPLES.

1.3. CSCE IS AN IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL ATTEMPT TO DEFINE AND

BROADEN COMMON GROUND IN ALL FIELDS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE. DETENTE IS ONLY POSSIBLE

ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.

1.4. MULTILATERAL DETENTE POLICY IS A NEW, ADDITIONAL DIMENSION

OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE PEOPLES THEMSELVES AND WHICH SHOULD BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO THEM.

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1.5. CSCE IS A STEP ON THE WAY TOWARDS GREATER CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVED COOPERATION IN EUROPE. IT IS NEITHER A TURNING POINT NOR THE CROWNING EVENT OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

1.6. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE ON A SOLID BASIS OF SECURITY WHICH, FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IS THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE RESULTS OF CSCE CAN NEITHER REPLACE NOR REDUCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED SECURITY WHICH IS FOUNDED ON COMMON DEFENCE EFFORTS.

2. SUCCESS OF WESTERN DETENTE EFFORTS

2.1. THE HOLDING OF CSCE WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE WILL TO DETENTE ON THE PART OF ALL CONCERNED. THE RESULTS ACHIEVED WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE WITHOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF NATO COUNTRIES.

2.2. THE WESTERN DETENTE CONCEPT GOES BACK TO THE "REPORT ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE" (THE "HARMEL REPORT") OF 1967. ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT, THE ALLIANCE FULFILLS TWO FUNCTIONS:

- THE MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATE MILITARY STRENGTH AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY AMONG THE ALLIES, AND

- THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL ISSUES IN EUROPE CAN BE SOLVED.

FOR THE ALLIANCE, MILITARY SECURITY AND A POLICY OF DETENTE ARE NOT A CONTRADICTION BUT THEY ARE COMPLEMENTARY.

2.3. ESPECIALLY SINCE 1969, THE ALLIANCE HAS ENGAGED IN AN INDIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE WARSAW PACT, AT THE SAME TIME THE ALLIES HAD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NON-COMMITTED AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES; FURTHERMORE THE ALLIES

MADE PROPOSALS FOR AN AGENDA FOR A "CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE". - ALL THESE EFFORTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

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- THE CONFERENCE WAS CAREFULLY PREPARED BILATERALLY AS WELL AS MULTILATERALLY,

- THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA COULD TAKE PART IN THE CONFERENCE ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS,

- TALKS ON THE QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR) BEGAN ON THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE CSCE.

2.4. DURING THE MULTILATERAL CSCE CONSULTATIONS IN HELSINKI, WESTERN IDEAS PREVAILED IN IMPORTANT MATTERS. THUS, IT WAS POSSIBLE

- TO INSERT INTO THE LIST OF "PRINCIPLES" TO BE DEFINED THOSE PRINCIPLES WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL;

- TO ENSURE THAT CERTAIN MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY WOULD BE DEALT WITH;

- TO INSCRIBE AS A CONCRETE ITEM INTO THE AGENDA THE IDEA THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND A BROADER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ARE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

3. THE RESULTS OF CSCE

3.1. THE FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CSCE WILL HAVE THE CHARACTER OF POLITICAL-MORAL DECLARATIONS OF INTENT AND WILL NOT CREATE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW.

3.2. THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WILL CONTAIN DECLARATIONS

OF INTENT IN THE FORM OF GENERAL RULES FOR ALL FIELDS OF COOPERATION.

THUS, THE LIST CONTAINS A PRINCIPLE RELATING TO COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES. THE LIST FURTHERMORE CONTAINS, AMONG OTHERS, THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, I.E. THE DECLARATION THAT FRONTIERS MAY NOT BE CHANGED
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BY MEANS OF FORCE, AS WELL AS A CLARIFICATION THAT

FRONTIERS CAN BE CHANGED BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND BY AGREEMENT.
THIS MAKES IT CLEAR THAT NO STATE IS BEING PREVENTED
FROM PURSUING ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

IN ADDITION, THE DECLARATION LISTS OTHER IMPORTANT
PRINCIPLES, FOR EXAMPLE THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES. ALL PRINCIPLES
ARE OF EQUAL VALUE AND SHALL BE INTERPRETED IN CONNECTION
WITH EACH OTHER.

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3.3. THE CSCE RESULTS WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROCESS OF
DETENTE IN EUROPE IS BOUND TO REMAIN INCOMPLETE WITHOUT THE
INCLUSION OF MILITARY ASPECTS INTO THE MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE.
THIS IDEA WILL FIND EXPRESSION IN AN UNDERSTANDING ON
CERTAIN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS THE PRE-
ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES AND THE EXCHANGE
OF OBSERVERS AT SUCH EXERCISES.

3.4. THE CONFERENCE HAS CONFIRMED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF
CLOSER ECONOMIC COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE RECOGNIZED
THAT COOPERATION CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVELY IMPROVED IF PEOPLE
ARE INCLUDED INTO THIS PROCESS MORE THAN IN THE PAST.
THUS, IT HAS NOW BEEN AGREED THAT BUSINESS CONTACTS SHOULD
BE FACILITATED AND MORE INFORMATION ON MARKETS AND PRO-
DUCTION CONDITIONS SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE.

3.5. AS A RESULT OF A WESTERN INITIATIVE, THE SUBJECT "COOPERATION
IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS" WAS INSERTED INTO THE
CSCE AGENDA AS ONE OF THE MAIN ITEMS. THE AIM OF THIS
SUBJECT WAS THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE,

A BROADER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION, AND BETTER CO-
OPERATION IN THE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS.
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THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ITEM OF THE CSCE AGENDA COVERS SUBJECTS
WHICH - IN TALKS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES - WERE
CONSIDERED "UNACCEPTABLE" ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO BECAUSE
RAISING THEM WAS REGARDED AS AN INTERFERENCE INTO THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THESE COUNTRIES. NOW WE CAN HOPE FOR
CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS WHICH, IT IS TRUE, STILL DO NOT SOLVE
THE PROBLEMS OF THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED BUT WHICH
NEVERTHELESS WILL CREATE THE FOUNDATION FROM WHICH IT MAY
BE POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THEIR LOT (I.E. REUNIFICATION OF
FAMILIES, MARRIAGE BETWEEN NATIONALS OF DIFFERENT STATES).

6. ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES AGREE THAT THE PROCESS OF
DETENTE MUST NOT STOP AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE. FOR
THIS REASON, THE CSCE PARTICIPANTS WILL, AFTER AN AGREED
PERIOD HAS ELAPSED, MEET AGAIN TO AGREE ON FURTHER IMPULSES
FOR THE MULTILATERAL DETENTE POLICY. CONFIDENCE AS A BASIS
FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS CAN ONLY BE BUILT IF THE GOVERN-
MENTS WILL RESPECT, IN THEIR DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES, THEIR
DECLARATIONS OF INTENT.

4. EFFECTS OF CSCE

IN ADDITION TO THE RESULTS WHICH ARE BEING LAID DOWN IN WRITING,
THE CONFERENCE HAS INITIATED DEVELOPMENTS AND STRENGTHENED TRENDS
WHICH ARE, OR MAY BECOME, IMPORTANT FOR THE FURTHER PROCESS OF
DETENTE IN EUROPE:

4.1. AN IMPORTANT POSITIVE RESULT FOR THE WEST WAS THE SUCCESSFUL
TEST OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE. CSCE HAS STRENGTHENED COHESION AMONG THEM.

4.2. THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS TO PLAY
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

4.3. THE CONFERENCE HAS REVIVED THE AWARENESS AMONG THE NON-
COMMITTED AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS WELL AS AMONG THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE THAT THEY BELONG TOGETHER.
IN FACT, THEY PURSUED IDENTICAL INTERESTS IN MANY FIELDS.

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4.4. THE PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE OF A CONSENSUS HAVING TO BE REACHED
STRENGTHENED THE FEELING OF INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL VALUE
OF MANY SMALLER COUNTRIES, EVEN IF THIS COULD NOT ALWAYS
BE OPENLY EXPRESSED.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

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4.5. THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS HAD ALREADY A CERTAIN LIBERALISING EFFECT ON THE DOMESTIC POLICIES OF PARTICIPATING STATES. A CASE IN POINT IS THE MORE RESTRAINED TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS BY THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY.

4.6. FINALLY, AN IMPORTANT GAIN OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE FACT THAT 35 COUNTRIES CAME TOGETHER FOR A JOINT STOCK-TAKING OF EAST-WEST PROBLEMS IN EUROPE. THIS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FIND OUT WHERE COMMON SOLUTIONS CAN BE ATTEMPTED AND WHERE DISAGREEMENTS WILL REMAIN FOR AN UNFORESEEABLE FUTURE. AS A RESULT OF THIS STOCK-TAKING EXERCISES A REALISTIC BASIS FOR DETENTE WAS CREATED WHICH MAY SERVE THE PARTICIPATING STATES AS A YARDSTICK TO MEASURE FUTURE DETENTE EFFORTS.

5. THE POST-CSCE PHASE

5.1. IT WILL HAVE TO BE SEEN AFTER THE CONFERENCE TO WHAT EXTENT THE FINAL DOCUMENTS WILL STAND THE TEST OF THEIR PRACTICAL APPLICATION.

5.2. THE CSCE DIMINISHES IN NO WAY THE NEED FOR A STRONG WESTERN

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DEFENCE ALLIANCE. THE OUTCOME OF THE CSCE IN NO WAY IMPEDES THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION IN WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE A

CONSTRUCTIVE FACTOR IN THE PROCESS OF BRINGING THE WHOLE
OF EUROPE CLOSER TOGETHER.

5.3. THE CSCE RESULTS ARE NOT DESIGNED TO FREEZE THE EXISTING
SITUATION IN EUROPE BUT TO INTENSIFY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
PEOPLES AND INDIVIDUALS IN EUROPE. BARRIERS ARE NOT TO
BE STRENGTHENED BUT TO BE REMOVED GRADUALLY. ONLY IF THIS
PROVES POSSIBLE WILL CSCE FULFIL THE HOPES PLACED IN IT
BY THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND THE WORLD.
END FRG TEXT.

4. WHILE WE HAVE GENERAL PREFERENCE FOR TIGHTER, MORE SHARPLY
FOCUSED DANISH DRAFT, FRG TEXT ALSO REPRESENTS USEFUL
CONTRIBUTION. ACCORDINGLY, AT NEXT SPC DISCUSSION WE PROPOSE
TO SAY THAT:

-- ALL THREE PAPERS (IS, DANISH AND FRG) MEET ORIGINAL
U.S. OBJECTIVE WHICH WAS TO STIMULATE THOUGHT PROCESS AND TO
DEVELOP GUIDELINES ON HOW ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DEAL
WITH CSCE IN PUBLIC.

-- DEPENDING ON MAJORITY PREFERENCE, WE COULD ACCEPT EITHER
DANISH OR FRG PAPER AS BASIS FOR FURTHER REFINEMENT OR
COULD ENVISAGE FURTHER IS DRAFT USING DANISH AND FRG EFFORTS
AS BUILDING-BLOCKS.

-- IN ANY EVENT, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PUT FINISHING
TOUCHES ON GENERAL GUIDELINES AND ON COMMENTARY ABOUT
SPECIFIC CSCE FEATURES ONLY WHEN STAGE II IS CLOSER
TO CONCLUSION.

-- WE BELIEVE CANADIAN SUBMISSION (PARA 14, REF B)
REPRESENTS HELPFUL STARTING-POINT FOR DEVELOPING ANNEX TO
GENERAL GUIDELINES PAPER WHICH WOULD INTERPRET SPECIFIC
CSCE FEATURES FOR USE IN PUBLIC COMMENTARY.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS ON
ABOVE APPROACH IN TIME FOR NEXT SPC DISCUSSION OF THIS
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SUBJECT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 5. BRUCE

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